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Michelle Giroux* Informing the Future of End-of-Life Care
in Canada: Lessons from the Quebec
Legislative Experience
There have been numerous and challenging developments respecting end-
of-life care in Canada. In Quebec, political consensus and changes in public
opinion led to the adoption of end-of-life care legislation. This paper discusses
the context and foundation of that reform and reviews its content with the
objective of informing the future of end-of-life care in Canada. In the first part of
the paper I explore the balancing of the right to life and autonomy, with a focus
on the approach chosen in Quebec by the Legal Experts Panel Report. In Part
11, I discuss Quebec's adoption of An Act Respecting End-of-Life Care, which
recognized the precedence of the right to autonomy at the end of life and what it
entails. I also highlight the differences between the approaches of Quebec and
the Supreme Court in the Carter decision to show how Carter affects the future of
the Quebec Act and, conversely, how Quebec's laws affect the development of
federal or provincial and territorial laws as we saw with the adoption of legislation
to amend the Criminal Code.
// y a eu plusieurs ddfis et changements importants concernant les soins de fin de
vie au Canada. Au Quebec, Iencadrement des soins de fin de vie s'est effectu6
suite a un ddbat social et politique non partisan qui a abouti a un consensus. Ce
texte traite du contexte et des fondements de cette rdforme et la prdsente dans
le but d'aider au ddveloppement et a Iorganisation des soins de fin de vie au
Canada. Dans la premiere partie de ce texte, jexplore la recherche de I'6quilibre
entre le droit a la vie et Iautonomie en mettant Iaccent sur Iapproche retenue au
Quebec par le Rapport du comite de juristes experts. Dans la deuxieme partie,
je discute de Iadoption au Quebec de la Loi concernant les soins de fin de vie
et des implications qui ddcoulent de la reconnaissance de la prdsdance du droit
a 'autonomie en fin de vie. Je souligne de plus les differences entre Iapproche
du Quebec et celle retenue par la Cour suprdme du Canada dans 'affaire Carter.
Ces differences sont importantes 6tant donne que la decision dans Carter affecte
Iavenir de la loi qu~bcoise et que, inversement, la loi qu~bcoise affecte le
ddveloppement de la loi f~ddrale et des lois provinciales et territoriales, comme
ce fut le cas lors de I'adoption des modifications au Code criminel.
* Full Professor, Faculty of Law, Civil Law Section, University of Ottawa. This paper is a
translation and update of the following book chapter, available only in French: "L'amenagement des
conflits en matiere de soins de fin de vie" in Catherine Regis, Lara Khoury & Robert P Kouri (eds),
Les grands conflits en droit de la sante. Les rencontres en droit de la sante--Volume I (Cowansville:
Editions Yvons Blais, 2016) at 35. The author is grateful to Lorian Hardcastle, assistant professor,
Faculty of Law and associate director, Centre for Health Law, Policy and Ethics at the University of
Ottawa, for commenting on this paper and to Pascale Klees Themens, law student at the Civil Law
Section at the University of Ottawa, for her research assistance and help in the translation of this text.
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Recently, there have been numerous and challenging developments
respecting end-of-life care in Canada. In Quebec, political consensus
and changes in public opinion led to the adoption of end-of-life care
legislation. This paper discusses the context and foundation of that reform
and reviews its content with the objective of informing the future of end-
of-life care in Canada.
Fundamental values are at the heart of the matter. From a legal
standpoint, the right to life or the sanctity of life must be interpreted in
light of the rights to liberty and autonomy.' Evolution in the provision
of health-care services and in the law increasingly challenge the existing
balance between the right to life and the right to autonomy. In this first part
of this paper, I explore the balancing of these values, with a focus on the
approach chosen in Quebec by the Legal Experts Panel Report.2 In Part
1. The word "autonomy" will be used as a synonym of inviolability, which is the word used in the
[CCQ] and of liberty.
2. This report is available only in French: Comite de juristes experts, Mettre en muvre les
recommandations de la Commission speciale de 1 Assemblee nationale sur la question de mourir dans
la dignite, janvier 2013 [Legal Experts Panel Report].
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II, I discuss Quebec's adoption of An Act Respecting End-of-Life Care,3
which recognized the precedence of the right to autonomy at he end of
life.
In Carter v Canada (Attorney General), a February 2015 decision,
a unanimous Supreme Court of Canada determined that the criminal
prohibition of assisted suicide was too broad. The Court found that the
government ought to permit medical assistance in dying, subject to certain
conditions.4 The Court spoke of the ruthless dilemma individuals will face
if the law does not establish a new balance between the protection of life at
any cost and the liberty of the person. In the first paragraph of its decision,
the Court states:
It is a crime in Canada to assist another person in ending her own life.
As a result, people who are grievously and irremediably ill cannot seek a
physician's assistance in dying and may be condemned to a life of severe
and intolerable suffering. A person facing this prospect has two options:
she can take her own life prematurely, often by violent or dangerous
means, or she can suffer until she dies from natural causes. The choice
is cruel.5
The Court based its judgement on a number of ideas. On one hand,
the Court was sensitive to the evolution of constitutional law. Since
hearing the Rodriguez6 case, medical assistance in dying or euthanasia
became legally permissible in several jurisdictions.' Evidence from these
permissive jurisdictions suggests that fears concerning the protection
of the vulnerable and slippery slope concerns did not materialize. This
evidence suggests hat the safeguards implemented by these jurisdictions
3. AnActRespectingEnd-of-Life Care, RSQ c S-32.0001 [Quebec Act]. For another study of the
Quebec Act, available only in French, see Michelle Giroux, "Droits et soins de fin de vie," in Melanie
Bourassa Forcier & Anne-Marie Savard, eds, Droit et politiques de la sante (Montreal: LexisNexis,
2014).
4. Carter v Canada (AG), 2015 SCC 5, [2015] 1 SCR 331 [Carter].
5. Ibid at para 1 [emphasis added].
6. Rodriguezv British Columbia (AG), [1993] 3 SCR 519, 1993 CanLII 75 (SCC) [Rodriguez]. It
will be recalled that Sue Rodriguez had argued in 1993 that section 241(b) Criminal Code, RSC 1985,
c C-46 [Criminal Code] should be declared unconstitutional because it infringed her fundamental
rights. Dealing with a degenerative disease (Lou Gehrig's disease), she would not be able to end her
life herself, even when getting to a point where she would not wish to continue it. This would force
her to end her own life prematurely in order to avoid causing legal risks to her friends or relatives who
would help her commit suicide. The Supreme Court of Canada had rejected her claim, but the decision
was close (five judges against four).
7. That is Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Switzerland, and the states of Oregon,
Washington, Vermont and California as well as Colombia. The province of Quebec can be added to
this list and now all Canada.
8. Who is the vulnerable person? One who suffers from mental illness or intellectual disability, or
one who would be at risk of not consenting in a free manner (for all sorts of reasons: chronic disease,
depression, emotional dependency, etc)?
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are effective in protecting these vulnerable groups. The fact that this
evidence was not available when Rodriguez was decided was used, in part,
to justify revisiting the issue of medical assistance in dying.9
According to the Court, the total prohibition of assisted suicide under
sections 241 (b) and 14 of the Criminal Code violates section 7 of the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedomso in a way that cannot be
justified under section 1. The violation of the right to life lies in the fact
that some individuals take their lives prematurely in fear that they will be
incapable of doing so at a later time due to the degeneration caused by
their disease. There is also a violation of the right to liberty because these
individuals are not free to make fundamental health care decisions. Finally,
the fact that individuals must endure intolerable suffering in the absence of
medical assistance in dying violates the right to security of the person. The
Court declined to explore whether the prohibition on assisted suicide also
violated the section 15 Charter right to equality. After declaring invalid
sections 241 (b) and 14 of the Criminal Code, Parliament was originally
granted a 12-month suspension of the declaration of invalidity to amend
the law. In January 2016, the Supreme Court extended the suspension fthe
declaration of invalidity for an extra four months, exempting Quebec from
the extension and permitting individual exemptions via an application to
superior court of their jurisdiction, according to the conditions mentioned
in paragraph 127 of Carter."
While this decision generally confirms the Quebec approach related to
medical aid in dying and gives legitimacy to its law,12 Some of the Supreme
9. On this aspect, the Supreme Court of Canada relies on the exhaustive analysis of the trial judge,
Smith J in Carter supra note 4 at paras 104-107, in particular para 107.
10. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, Schedule B
to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 ss 1, 7 [Charter]. See Criminal Code, supra note 6, ss 14,
241(b).
11. The federal government filed a motion to the Supreme Court for a six-month extension of the
12-month suspension. This motion was heard on 11 January 2016. See Carter v Canada (AG), 2016
SCC 4, 394 DLR (4th) 1, namely para 7 (Abella, Karakatsanis, Wagner, Gascon and Cote JJ). For the
first decision on an individual exemption, see HS (Re), 2016 ABQB 121, rendered on 29 February
2016. The Alberta Court of Appeal has also rejected the appeal from the Attorney General of Canada
in Canada (Attorney General) v E.E, 2016 ABCA 155, thus confirming the constitutional exemption
granted by the motion judge. It is worth noting that the case concerned a person with a psychiatric
condition-a severe conversion disorder-who was nevertheless competent and not terminally ill.
12. This was also recently confirmed by the Quebec Court of Appeal in Quebec (Procureure
gendrale) v D'Amico, 2015 QCCA 2138, D Amico v Quebec (Procureure gndrale), 2015 QCCS
5556. In this decision, the highest court of the province quashed a judgment of the Superior Court
which had concluded that the sections of the Quebec Act, supra note 3, pertaining to medical
assistance in dying could not enter into force until February 2016, at the expiration of the suspension
of the declaration of invalidity given by the Supreme Court in Carter. However, the case on the
motion for declaration of invalidity remains to be heard and decided by the Quebec Superior Court.
However, on 12 September 2016 one of the plaintiffs, Lisa D'Amico, had her name removed from
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Court's conclusions bring important nuances to the debate over the
regulation of end-of-life decisions and leave some questions unanswered.
This paper will highlight the differences between the approaches of
Quebec and the Supreme Court, which is important given that Carter
affects the future of the Quebec Act and, conversely, Quebec's laws affect
the development of federal or provincial and territorial laws.13
I. Evolution of healthcare, social debates and the law: Towards a new
balance between the right to life and the right to autonomy
1. Evolution of health care and of social debates
The Colldge des mctdecins du Qudbec put the debate about medical
assistance in dying on Quebec's political agenda in October 2008. Its
clinical ethics working group's report specified the following:
Natural death is not such a reliable reference anymore. With medical
progress, the moment of death is increasingly becoming the object of a
decision. When faced with death, we now can and must make choices.
Therefore, new coherent means to understand and frame these choices
must be found."
Advances in medicine have extended life expectancy. New types of care,
such as respirators, can make treatment more intrusive than it once was,
both during and at the end of life. Death went from a natural phenomenon
to a medicalized process. Decisions in this context are now often driven by
patient preferences and values, rather than the limits of medicine. Quebec
cases dating back to the early 1990s illustrate this shift. In the Nancy B" and
the current motion as she disagreed with the other plaintiffs' strategy to also attack the validity of the
Act to amend the Criminal Code and to make related amendments to other Acts (medical assistance
in dying). She has however expressed her intention to file a new motion, see D>Amico v Quebec
(Procureuregendrale), 2016 QCCS 4390. It remains to be seen what will happento these two distinct
procedures. To our knowledge, plaintiff Paul Saba did not fill another procedure within the 30 days
of the judgment and Lisa D'Amico has still a few days to introduce a new procedure; she has 60 days
following the judgment to do so.
13. For other reports that have been released after Carter to inform developments of the law in
Canada, see: Provincial-Territorial Expert Advisory Group on Physician-Assisted Dying, Final Report,
November 2015 which can be consulted on each provinces' and territories' governmental website
<http://news.ontario.ca/mohltc/en/2015/12/provincial-territorial-expert-advisory-group-completes-
report-on-physician-assisted-dying.html?utmsource=ondemand&utmmedium~email&utm_
campaign-o> [Provincial-Territorial ExpertAdvisory Group]; Special Joint Committee on Physician-
Assisted Dying, Medical Assistance in Dying: A Patient-Centred Approach, February 2016, 42nd
Parliament, 1st Session [Special Joint Committee Report]. See also External Panel on Options for a
Legislative Response to Carter v Canada, Final Report, December 2015, online: <http://www.ep-ce.
ca/home>.
14. Report available only in French: College des medecins, Pour des soins approprids au debut, tout
au long et en fin de vie, Rapport du groupe de travail en ethique clinique, 2008, at 29 (our translation,
citations omitted).
15. Nancy B v H6tel-Dieu de Quebec, [1992] RJQ 361 (CS) 86 DLR (4th) 385 [Nancy B].
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Corbeill6 cases, competent adult patients wished to, respectively, withdraw
life maintaining treatments (respirator) and cease nutrition and hydration.
They received permission from the Superior Court to do so, despite the
fact that death would naturally follow the withdrawl of treatment. These
cases, along with changes in medical care and important reports by the
Law Reform Commission of Canada" and the Special Senate Committe
on Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide," set the stage for the important social
and legal debates that would follow.
Debates over medical assistance in dying were renewed in Quebec in
2009 with the creation of the Select Committee on Dying with Dignity.19
The Committee's March 2012 report contained 24 recommendations,
including one stressing the importance of recognizing and regulating
medical assistance in dying. In order to implement these, the Minister
of Justice created a Legal Experts Panel,20 whose report was published
in January 2013.21 In June 2013, Bill 52 was presented to the National
Assembly of Quebec,22 followed by a detailed study of this bill in
Parliamentary Committee. In spite of a provincial election in the spring
of 2014, Bill 52 was rapidly adopted on 5 June 2014.23 This political
consensus thus confirmed public opinion on the matter.
16. Manoir de la Pointe Bleue Inc v Corbeil [1992] RJQ 712 (CS) [Corbeil].
17. Law Reform Commission of Canada, Euthanasia, Aiding Suicide and Cessation of Treatment,
Report #20, 1983.
18. Special Senate Committee on Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide, OfLife and Death, Final Report,
1995.
19. The Select Committee was composed of deputies from across the political spectrum. It
observed end-of-life care practices by travelling to Europe. It organised consultations around
Quebec's major cities. In total, more than 30 experts were met and more than 300 memoirs and
applications to intervene were filed. An online survey received over 6000 replies. See final report:




20. This panel was composed of Jean-Pierre Menard (president), Jean-Claude Hebert and Michelle
Giroux.
21. Supranote2.
22. Bill 52, An Act respecting end-of-life care, 1st session, 40th Leg, Quebec, 2013 [Bill 52]. The
vote for the adoption in principle on October 29, 2013 is apportioned as follows: Yeas 84, Nays 26,
Abstention 0.
23. The vote for the adoption of Bill 52 is apportioned as follows: Yeas 94, Nays 22, Abstentions
0. The assent took place on 10 June 2014. The entry into force, with the exception of a few sections
concerning the advance medical directives register, took place on 10 December 2015. Sections 52, 57,
58, 63 and 64, dealing with the advance medical directives register came into force on 16 December
2015.
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2. The evolution of law: A particular focus on the rise of the right to
autonomy
Changes in medical care were accompanied by an evolution in both
private law and fundamental rights and freedoms. Although the courts
have recognized the right to autonomous decision-making in health care
over the past several decades, criminal laws respecting the protection
of life have remained unchanged since 1892.24 In order to remedy this
discrepancy, criminal law must evolve to respect he right to autonomy, as
illustrated by the Legal Experts Panel Report.25
In Quebec private civil law, the principle of the inviolability of the
person emerged in the Civil Code of Lower Canada in 1971.26 The right
to autonomy has gradually broadened since its enactment. The decision
of the Superior Court in 1984 in Canada (Procureur gndral) v. Hpital
Notre-Dame2 7 illustrates the expansion of autonomy. That case involved
a forced intervention to remove an iron wire from the oesophagus of a
patient who had swallowed it and who preferred dying over being deported
to his country in accordance with a decision from immigration authorities.
The Courts would today probably reject this compulsory treatment,
finding that it is not up to courts or medical professionals to scrutinize
the reasonableness of his decision, but rather up to the patient to make
judgments on quality of life. 28 The Nancy B2 9 and Corbeil3 0 cases, which
followed a 1989 reform of the law of persons, also illustrate the increasing
importance of autonomy in the context of medical decision-making. As
noted above, these cases upheld the right of a patient to refuse care, even
if death will follow.
However, the right to autonomy was truly consecrated in 1991
during the reform of the Civil Code of Qudbec.3 1 For example of this, not
requiring consent in case of emergency is not considered an exception to
the rule anymore. Indeed, while consent to treatment was not required in
an emergency prior to the amendments, article 13 C.C.Q. now requires
24. Criminal Code, 1892 (55-56 Vict. c. 29).
25. Supra note 2 at 21-56.
26. Similar developments emerged in the common law jurisdictions in the rest of Canada. See
Malette v Shulman, [1990] OJ No 450, 67 DLR (4th) 321 (CA). "Nancy B correctly states the law in
common law provinces as well." See Rodriguez, supra note 6 at 598 cited in Carter v Canada (AG),
2012 BCSC 886, 261 CRR (2d) 1 atpara 217.
27. [1984] CS 426, 8 CRR 382.
28. Legal Experts Panel Report, supra note 2 at 57-61, in particular at 59-60.
29. Nancy B, supra note 6.
30. Corbeil, supra note 7.
31. Legal Experts Panel Report, supra note 2 at 72-74.
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consent, even in case of emergency, where it can be obtained in due time.
Furthermore, as expressed by the Minister of Justice:
This last provision is intended to both engage the medical practice and
enhance respect of the fundamental right of the inviolability of the person
by setting, as a principle, the respect of denial of treatment expressed
in due time. Despite this, the article establishes that under certain
circumstances, the consent, substituted or not, is necessary, even if the
person's consent cannot be obtained in due time; this rule is intended
to avoid futile medical care. By these provisions, article 13 is aiming at
recognizing a certain primacy of the quality of life on the maintenance
of life at all costs, in unacceptable conditions.32
The Legal Experts Panel Report also describes the shifting balance between
the right to autonomy and the sanctity of life following the adoption of the
Quebec and the Canadian charters of rights:
The judicial interpretation given by the Supreme Court o this concept
is taking into consideration the evolution of healthcare and the law. It
nonetheless moves inthe same direction, whichis the progressive increase
of the right of a person to make crucial and fundamental decisions as
he or she chooses, without state interference... .This evolution of the
autonomy ... of the person has the effect of mitigating the concept of the
sanctity of life, which takes less importance in the end of life when the
decision-making autonomy of the person affirms itself in order to allow
this person to control the time and the way of dying.33
In short, this evolution in the law must necessarily inform the
interpretation of the Criminal Code. This is illustrated in Nancy B, where
the judge, in obiter, reassured the physician that he did not have to fear
criminal prosecution if he unplugged his patient from the respirator,
despite section 14 of the Criminal Code, which, prior to Carter, prohibited
a person from consenting to his or her own death.34
Criminal law must therefore take note of this evolution.35 Indeed, as
mentioned, the sections regarding the protection of life in the Criminal
Code have not been modified since 1892, except in 1972 when suicide
32. Ministry of Justice, Commentaires du ministre de la Justice. Le Code civil du Quebec, Tome 1,
Quebec, Les Publications du Quebec, 1993, art 13 at 14-15 (our translation).
33. Legal Experts Panel Report, supra note 2 at 203-205 (our translation). It may be recalled that a
similar evolution allowed women a greater freedom and security regarding birth control, before the
declaration of inoperability of section 251 of the Criminal Code, supra note 6 in R v Morgentaler
[1988] 1 SCR 30. The administration of justice being within provincial competence, the attorney
generals of the provinces and territories no longer applied criminal aw, which prohibited abortion
under certain conditions, even though criminal law is within federal competence.
34. Nancy B, supra note 15 at 366-367.
35. For more details on criminal law, see Legal Experts Panel Report, supra note 2 at 21ff.
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attempts were decriminalized. Faced with inertia in the language of the
Criminal Code, courts must interpret the criminal law in a manner that
reflects the evolution of private laws respecting individual rights and the
public law understanding of human rights:
Traditional values, which inspired the rules of the Criminal Code, must
today be interpreted in respect of the new social values, expressed by the
Charter and confirmed by the courts. In this context, the emergence of a
value such as the decision-making autonomy of a person, or one's right
to self-determination, has a definite impact on the traditional analyses of
the Criminal Code's provisions regarding the protection of life.36
Although the laws respecting medically assisted dying remained
unchanged, shifts in public opinion and the increasing emphasis on
autonomous medical decisions may partially explain the few accusations
against physicians who have assisted patients in ending their lives.
Furthermore, when accusations are made, evidence of the criminal intent
of a physician claiming to have acted out of compassion or proof of death
causation often becomes very difficult to establish. And finally, when a
guilty verdict is reached, sentences are generally minimal and without
real deterrent effect.3 7 In summary, and as expressed in this excerpt of the
Legal Experts Panel Report:
These legal developments reflect an important evolution of social values
and of society's expectations regarding the governance of the end
of the life of a person. The actual law practically infiltrates in all the
end-of-life process in a direction that goes against the Criminal Code's
philosophy by promoting the affirnation of individual autonomy and
of one's consent... The Attorney General and the Crown's prosecutor
cannot ignore these developments in the analysis of end-of-life medical
practices, because they ought to be considered in this analysis, along with
other factors, for the appreciation of the public's interest in prosecuting.38
Beyond situations directly involving physicians, there have been
several cases of individuals who felt compelled to assist relatives in ending
their lives, due to the inertia of criminal law.3 9 Although Quebec's reform
36. Ibid at 204-205 (our translation).
37. See R v Houle, 2006 QCCS 319, 38 CR (6th) 242 [Houle]. The case of Ms Houle, who had
helped her son die, may be recalled. Her sentence had only consisted of a three-year probation period.
For further detail see ibid at 21-56.
38. Legal Experts Panel Report, supra note 2 at 56 (our translation).
39. Houle, supra note 37. Consider the following quotations from this judgement (our translation):
"[77] It is obvious that if the current Canadian regime had allowed Charles to choose to die with
dignity, freely and in an informed manner, in a setting which would have guaranteed all the necessary
protection, we would not be here today. Ms Houle would not have committed the crime of which she
is being accused.... [81] She has committed the crime of which she is being accused in specific and
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allows for physicians to medically assist a patient in dying, it will remain
an offence for individuals who are not medical professionals to provide
assisted dying.
The conception of the protection of life reflected in the Criminal
Code of 1892 is difficult to reconcile with modem views which attempt
to balance the protection of life with autonomy. The Quebec approach
better reflects the evolution of both health care and law. It provides for
an evolving interpretation of criminal law, respectful of the evolution of
health care and the law, which should now allow medical assistance in
dying. For the Legal Experts Panel, the focus on outdated criminal laws
became less pertinent given shared jurisdiction over health and provincial
powers to regulate hospitals and health professionals. It is against this
backdrop that the reform took place.
II. The Quebec Act Respecting End-of-Life Care: Consecration ofa
new balance between the right to life and the right to autonomy
The Quebec Act," which is enforced by the Minister of Health and Social
Services, provides mechanisms for more options for end-of-life care across
the continuum of health care services. As I describe below, the Quebec
Act also clarifies actual practices in end-of-life care. It also recognizes
new modes of end-of-life care and organizes a system for managing these
services. Finally, the Quebec Act provides measures aimed at increasing
knowledge and surveillance of end-of-life care.
1. Clarifications regarding already recognized practices
The new law modifies article 11 C.C.Q. to expressly acknowledge a
patient's right to refuse treatment, including life-sustaining care, which
is allowed for all patients over 14 years. The law also indicates that the
refusal or withdrawal of consent can be expressed by any means:
Except as otherwise provided by law, a person of full age who is capable
of giving consent o care may, at any time, refuse to receive life-sustaining
care or withdraw consent o such care.
To the extent provided by the Civil Code, a minor of 14 years of age or
over, and in the case of a minor or a person of full age who is incapable
of giving consent, the person who may give consent to care on their
behalf may also make such a decision.
The refusal of care or withdrawal of consent to care may be expressed
by any means.
uncommon circumstances. The risk of recidivism is therefore null because there is no indication that
she is susceptible to committing such a crime in any other context."
40. See Quebec Act, supra note 3 and accompanying text.
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The physician must make sure that such a decision is made freely and
provide the person with all information needed to make an informed
decision, in particular information about other therapeutic possibilities,
including palliative care."
These provisions represent the codification of principles previously
recognized in Nancy B and Corbeil. However, these principles remain
difficult to apply, as shown in the 2014 decision Centre de santd et de
services sociaux Pierre-Boucher v. Van Landschoot case, where a patient's
request to end a treatment was brought to the Superior Court despite
clear rulings in the previously mentioned cases.4 2 In Van Landschoot, the
Superior Court confirmed that a patient who was rendered quadriplegic
in a parachute accident could discontinue all nutrition and hydration. The
court also ordered "that Pierre-Boucher Health and Social Services Center,
its nursing and medical staff provide appropriate medication to efficiently
relieve the pain of Mr. Pierre Mayance in order to allow him a gentle and
dignified death."43 In these decisions, patients are not initially at the end
of their life; they wish for life-sustaining treatments to be discontinued.
Ending these treatments will, however, cause death in the short term. Van
Landshoot illustrates the importance of this clarification in the recent
legislation in order to reflect the principles recognized by jurisprudence
and to avoid unnecessary disputes the next time a competent patient clearly
expresses his or her wishes to end a treatment.
The Quebec Act also brings two types of changes regarding medical
wishes expressed by an individual capable of giving consent, but which
apply should that individual become incapable of giving consent in the
future. First, article 12 C.C.Q. is modified to give additional weight to
previously expressed wishes: "[a] person who gives his consent to or
refuses care for another person is bound to act in the sole interest of that
person, complying, as far as possible, with any wishes the latter may have
expressed...." In contrast, the previous version specified that substitute
decision makers' decisions only required "taking into account, as far as
possible, wishes the latter may have expressed...."
The Quebec Act also creates a new form of expression for previously
expressed wishes: binding advance medical directives (AMD).44 Section
52 of the Quebec Act reads:
41. QuebecAct, ibid, s 5.
42. 2014 QCCS 4284 [Van Landschoot]. See also, available only in French: Isabelle Marcoux et al,
"Ce que les professionnels de la sante comprennent des aspects juridiques des soins de fin de vie au
Quebec" (2015), 61:4 Le medecin de famille canadien 197.
43. Van Landschoot, ibid at para 41 (our translation).
44. Quebec Act, supra note 3, ss 51ff.
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[AMD] are given by notarial act en minute or in the presence of witnesses
on the fon prescribed by the Minister.
At the request of their author, [they can be] recorded in the advance
medical directives register established under section 63.
A substitute decision maker can only consent to treatment on behalf of
an incapable patient if the person incapable of giving consent has not filed
an AMD. By contrast, if the patient has an AMD, these wishes must be
respected." The only exceptions are when a court "has reasonable grounds
to believe that the author of the directives was not capable of consenting
to the care at the time of signing the directives or that the directives do not
correspond to the author's wishes in the present situation.... "46
These welcome changes will facilitate end-of-life care management
by medical professionals and family members. It is also hoped that
these legislative changes will reduce the taboo associated with end-of-
life discussions. Indeed, notwithstanding the fact that jurisprudence has
clarified certain rules, decision making by the patient's representative is
often very sensitive and emotional and thus not always effective. Centre
de santd et services sociaux Richelieu Yamaska v. L. (M)" is a good
illustration of disagreement sometimes occurring over care decisions. In
this case, a 91-year-old woman in a state of cerebral death, was being kept
alive artificially with the help of a respirator. The family disagreed over
what their mother would have wished for, and the court confirmed that the
patient would have wanted to be disconnected from the respirator to avoid
futile medical treatment. The binding power now given to prior expressed
wishes will certainly affect how end-of-life issues and disagreements will
be handled in the future, if patients do prepare them."
In addition to disagreements between family members, there are cases
where it is the family and physicians who are at odds, as exemplified by
Rasouli.4 9 Lambert et autres v. France, recently decided by the European
Human Rights Court," also exemplifies such disagreements. Both cases
45. Ibid, s 61. This section provides that the court may order that these directives be respected. See
also the new wording of articles 11 and 15 CCQ.
46. Quebec Act, ibid.
47. 2006 QCCS 2094, [2006] RDF 420.
48. Under section 62 of the Quebec Act, supra note 3, it is important to note that AMD prevail over
Instructions relating to care expressed in a mandate given in anticipation of a person's incapacity.
49. Cuthbertson v Rasouli, 2013 SCC 53, [2013] 3 SCR 341. In this case, the Supreme Court of
Canada concluded that, following the Ontario legal framework, the withdrawal of life support and
the administration of palliative care were treatments which required consent, and any issues and
disagreements between family members and physicians of the incapable patient with regards to these
treatments had to be brought before the Consent and Capacity Board.
50. Lambert v France [GC], No 46043/14, [2005] ECHR 185, 62 EHRR 2 [Lambert]. In this case,
Informing the Future of End-of-Life Care in Canada: 443
Lessons from the Quebec Legislative Experience
involved patients in a minimally conscious or chronic vegetative state.
The first was being kept alive by a respirator. The other was not but
continued to be fed and hydrated. Both cases exemplify the need to bring
more clarity to the law to increase respect for autonomy or patients' wishes
when expressed before incompetency in an advance directive.
2. Recognition of new end-of-life care
Apart from these clarifications regarding recognized end-of-life practices,
the Quebec Act also establishes the right to palliative care and the right to
medical assistance in dying.
a. Palliative care
Palliative care is defined as follows:
[T]he total and active care delivered by an interdisciplinary team to
patients suffering from a disease with reserved prognosis, in order to
relieve their suffering, without delaying or hastening death, maintain the
best quality of life possible and provide them and their close relations the
support they need."
Although the Quebec Act created a right to palliative care, this type of care
was already provided in health-care institutions, palliative care hospices
and sometimes even at home. This type of care is not controversial, with the
exception of continuous palliative sedation, which is defined as follows:
[C]are that is offered as part of palliative care and consists in administering
medications or substances to an end-of-life patient to relieve their
suffering by rendering them unconscious without interruption until
death ensues.5 2
the European Court of Human Rights concluded that the decision from the French Conseil d'Etat
following which physicians could legally cease the artificial hydratation and nutrition maintaining the
incompetent patient alive was not in violation of Article 2 (protection for right to life) of the European
Convention on Human Rights, 4 November 1950, ETS No 005 (entered into force 3 September 1953).
It is to be noted that in France, the French Public Health Code (Code de la Sante Publique-CSP) leaves
more room for the inclusion of the family's wishes in case of incapacity, see namely article L. 1111-4
(our translation): "When a person is no longer in a condition to express his or her wishes, no treatment
or investigation can be practiced, except in emergency or impossibility, unless the trusted person set
out as in article L. 1111-6, or the family or a close person has been consulted." However, another
article of the Public Health Code stipulates in an even clearer way than it is in Quebec that futile
medical care is not permitted: Art L.1110-5 (our translation): "These actions may not be undertaken
through unreasonable obstinacy. When they appear futile, disproportionate or have no other effects
that only artificially maintaining life, they can be suspended or not be undertaken In this case, the
physician safeguards the dignity of the dying person and ensures the quality of life of this person by
dispensing care provided under art L.1110-10."
51. Quebec Act, supra note 3, s 3(4).
52. Ibid, s 3(5) (emphasis added).
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Prior to the legislative reform, the practice of continuous palliative
sedation was not understood or used in the same way by all, with some
perceiving it as a form of euthanasia, and others as a form of care.53 The
Legal Experts Report illustrates this confusion:
In the current regulatory environment, certain tenninal sedation practices
are part of the "slippery slope" area of the application of palliative care.
In the absence of a structured framework, this practice is not (or poorly)
documented. The criticisms voiced throughout the jurisdictions where
tenninal sedation is practiced point out a frequent absence of patient
consent to this practice. The withdrawal of nutrition and hydration, while
the patient is not yet at the stage of his agony where these procedures are
justifiable, cause problem.
For example, in the Netherlands, according to a study published in 2004,
tenninal sedation was preferred to euthanasia by physicians because it
did not require consent of the patient, unlike euthanasia."
This confusion prompted legislators to regulate the provision of
continuous palliative sedation i order to protect patients. Section 24 of
the Quebec Act outlines the preconditions for the provision of continuous
palliative sedation:
Before giving consent to continuous palliative sedation, an end-of-life
patient or where applicable, the person who may give consent o care
on behalf of the patient must among other things be informed of the
prognosis for the illness, the irreversible nature of the sedation and the
anticipated duration of the sedation.
In addition, the physician must make sure that the request is being made
freely, in particular by ascertaining that it is not being made as a result
of external pressure.
Consent to continuous palliative sedation must be given in writing on
the form prescribed by the Minister and be filed in the patient's record.
(emphasis added)
According to the Legal Experts Panel, "such procedure will prevent
terminal sedation from being used as a procedure to bypass the medical
assistance in dying rules.""5 It remains to be seen whether this procedure
will allow for better understanding and control over this type of care, or
whether these conditions will limit access to continuous palliative sedation.
53. See namely the results of a survey on euthanasia conducted by the Federation des mddecins
spcialistes du Quebec, online: <https://www.fmsq.org/en/mediatheque/dap/euthanasie2>. For further
detail on continuous palliative sedation, see generally Legal Experts Panel Report, supra note 2 at
248ff.
54. Legal Experts Panel Report, supra note 2 at 254 (our translation, citation omitted).
55. Ibid at 350 (our translation).
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This is a question not addressed in Carter. Future Canadian legislation
could be informed by how Quebec dealt with it.
b. Medical assistance in dying
The Quebec Act also recognizes medical assistance in dying, which is a
new form of care. This care is defined as follows:
[C]are consisting in the administration by a physician of medications or
substances to an end-of-life patient, at the patient's request, in order to
relieve their suffering by hastening death.56
Section 26 provides strict criteria that must be met in order for a patient
to obtain medical assistance in dying:
(1) be an insured person within the meaning of the Health Insurance
Act ... ;
(2) be offull age and capable of giving consent o care;
(3) be at the end of life;
(4) suffer from a serious and incurable illness;
(5) be in an advanced state of irreversible decline in capability; and
(6) experience constant and unbearable physical or psychological
suffering which cannot be relieved in a manner the patient
deems tolerable.... (emphasis added)
Thus, only a person of full age who is competent can formulate a
request for medical assistance in dying. Section 51 ofthe QuebecAct clearly
states that such a request cannot be made through an AMD. However some
arguments were made during debates on the Quebec legislation to the effect
that excluding the possibility of expressing in advance such a request could
constitute discrimination and thus be subject of a future constitutional
challenge." This is a rule which is likely to change in the future. The
Court's decision in Carter does not clearly address this, given the facts
before it; it refers only to a "competent adult.""8 Belgium and Luxembourg
statutes allow advance medical directives for people finding themselves
56. Quebec Act, supra note 3, s 3(6).
57. See namely Chambre des notaires, Memoire portant sur le Projet de loi N' 52 Loi concernant
les soins de fin de vie, 24 September 2013; Commission des droits de la personne et de la jeunesse,
Memoire a la Commission de la sante et des services sociaux de lAssemblee nationale-Projet de loi
no 52 Loi concernant les soins de fin de vie, CSSS 039, CP PL 52, September 2013, at p 10ff. The
Legal Experts Panel would have allowed them, see Legal Experts Panel Report, supra note 2 at 378-
386.
58. Carter, supra note 4 at para 4: "We conclude that the prohibition on physician-assisted dying
is void insofar as it deprives a competent adult of such assistance where (1) the person affected
clearly consents to the termination of life; and (2) the person has a grievous and irremediable medical
condition (including an illness, disease or disability) that causes enduring suffering that is intolerable
to the individual in the circumstances of his or her condition. We therefore allow the appeal."
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in an irreversible coma, but not for people suffering from dementia.59
More recently, the Special Joint Committee Report (Recommendation 7)
and the Provincial-Territorial Expert Advisory Group (recommendations
12 and 13)60 recommended in a similar but not identical way the use of
advance directives for medical assistance in dying, on the condition that
such requests be made after having received a diagnosis of a grievous and
irremediable condition and with the condition that procedural safeguards
be put in place to insure autonomous decision.
As to the request for medical assistance in dying, it must be made in the
form prescribed by the Minister and provided by a health professional.61
Section 28 of the Quebec Act states that a patient may withdraw his or
her request for medical aid in dying "at any time and by any means" and
that "a patient may also, at any time and by any means, request that the
administration of medical aid in dying be put off."
The criteria set out in section 26 of the Quebec Act mirror, but only
partially, those set out by the Supreme Court of Canada:
We conclude that the prohibition on physician-assisted dying is void
insofar as it deprives a competent adult of such assistance where (1)
the person affected clearly consents to the termination of life; and (2)
the person has a grievous and irremediable medical condition (including
an illness, disease or disability) that causes enduring suffering that
is intolerable to the individual in the circumstances of his or her
condition....6
2
Unlike Quebec's approach, the Supreme Court does not require the
end of life or the advanced state of irreversible decline in capability to
access to medical assistance in dying. The end-of-life difference was the
subject of some debate before the Parliamentary Committee considering
Quebec's Bill 52, as some argued that the concept of end-of-life should
be clarified, while others did not believe in the necessity of requiring this
criterion, nor the criterion of the advanced state of irreversible decline in
capability.63 Different views persist and this will need to be fixed for the
59. For more details on the issue and with a comparative law perspective, see Legal Experts Panel
Report, supra note 2 at 378ff.
60. The same position was taken in Provincial-Territorial Expert Advisory Group, supra note 13
at recommendation 12: "that at any time following the diagnosis of a grievous and irremediable
condition, a request for physician-assisted ying made through a valid patient declaration form may
be filled when suffering becomes intolerable."
61. For further details, see Quebec's Minister of Health and Social Services website, online: <http://
sante.gouv.qc.ca/en/programmes-et-mesures-daide/aide-medicale-a-mourir/demarche/>.
62. Carter, supra note 4 at para 4.
63. For further detail on Bill 52's Parliamentary Proceedings, ee the National Assembly of Quebec's
website, online: <http://www.assnat.qc.ca/en/travaux-parlementaires/projets-loi/projet-loi-52-40-1.
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future of medical assistance in dying.6 4 However, the Supreme Court in
Carter does not expressly say that one does have to be at the end of life
to request medical assistance in dying. The February 2016 Special Joint
Committee Report goes even further. It does not require that a patient be at
the end of life to request medical assistance in dying and would also allow
requests from patient with psychiatric conditions.65
Quebec's law also specifies physician obligations with regard to end-
of-life care. In particular, section 29 reads as follows:
Before administering medical assistance in dying, the physician must
(1) be of the opinion that the patient meets all the criteria ofsection
26, after, among other things,
(a) making sure that the request is being made freely, in particular
by ascertaining that it is not being made as a result of external
pressure;
(b) making sure that the request is an informed one, in particular
by inforning the patient of the prognosis for the illness and of other
therapeutic possibilities and their consequences;
(c) verifying the persistence of suffering and that the wish to obtain
medical aid in dying remains unchanged, by talking with the patient
at reasonably spaced intervals given the progress of the patient's
condition;
(d) discussing the patient's request with any members of the care
team who are in regular contact with the patient; and
(e) discussing the patient's request with the patient's close relations,
if the patient so wishes;
(2) make sure that the patient has had the opportunity to discuss the
request with the persons they wished to contact... (emphasis added)
Finally, once the physician has reached the conclusion that the patient
can have access to medical assistance in dying, the opinion of a second
physician must be solicited according to paragraph (3) and section 29:
[O]btain the opinion of a second physician confirming that the criteria
set out in section 26 have been met.
The physician consulted must be independent of both the patient
requesting medical aid in dying and the physician seeking the second
html>.
64. See the constitutional challenge of section 241.2 of the Criminal Code, as amended by An Act
to amend the Criminal Code and to make related amendments to other Acts (medical ssistance in
dying), LC 2016, c 3, [Bill C-14] in Julia Lamb and British Columbia Civil Liberties Association v.
Attorney General of Canada, Supreme Court of British Columbia, file number 165851. Plaintiff Julia
Lamb, age 25, suffers from spinal muscular atrophy and claims her right to be protected from suffering
is not respected as the current legislation allows for medical assistance in dying only to those whose
natural death is "reasonably foreseeable."
65. Special Joint Committee Report supra note 13 at recommendations 2 and 3.
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medical opinion. The physician consulted must consult the patient's
record, examine the patient and provide the opinion in writing. (emphasis
added)
The legislation also contains various rules respecting the functions of
the councils of physicians, dentists and pharmacists6 6 and the Collage des
mdecins du Qudbec.6 7 These entities will be responsible for assessing the
quality of care provided to patients.
In sum, this legislation reflects the government's belief that in light of
the evolution of medicine and the law, medical assistance in dying naturally
fits within the continuum of end-of-life care. This type of care aims to
manage heartbreaking dilemmas at the end of life, which would have
continued in the absence of such an alternative. However, it is important
to note that medical assistance in dying will remain an exceptional form of
care to be provided in exceptional cases and will always be subject to an
individual's consent.
Legislation will also need to address whether medical assistance
in dying will be available to mature minors, who are individuals under
the age of majority but deemed to have sufficient understanding to have
capacity for the purposes of medical decision making. The Quebec Act
prohibits such access by minors, primarily due to a lack of social and
political consensus on this question. Carter, with a general reference to a
"competent adult," did not provide a definite answer to the question. The
Court refers to a "competent adult" only and is silent on minors. However,
while discussing the issue of vulnerability, without referring explicitly to
the mature minor doctrine, the Court mentions "the potential vulnerability
of adolescents who are faced with life-and-death decisions about medical
treatment,"6 8 but acknowledges "the viability of an individual assessment
of decisional capacity in the context of that case."6 9 The Special Joint
Committee Report recommended "a two-stage legislative process" that
would allow medically assisted dying for competent adults now and in
three years to mature minors." The Provincial-Territorial Expert Advisory
Group recommended that "[a]ccess to physician-assisted ying should...
be based on competence rather than age."n
66. QuebecAct, supra note 3, ss 33-35.
67. Ibid, ss 36-37.
68. Carter, supra note 4 at para 116.
69. Ibid. See also AC v Manitoba (Director of Child and Family Services), 2009 SCC 30, [2009] 2
SCR 181.
70. Special Joint Committee Report, supra note 13 at recommendation 6. It also urges the
Government of Canada to organize a study including general consultations of this issue. As we now
know, Bill C-14, supra note 64, does not allow a mature minor to access medical aid in dying.
71. Provincial-Territorial Expert Advisory Group, supra note 13, at recommendation 17. For a
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3. A health care system for better management of end-of-life care
The Quebec Act contains several sections regarding health care and social
services related to end-of-life care. These rules specify the rights and
obligations of patients and medical professionals, and the organization of
end-of-life services provided by institutions,2 palliative care hospices7 3 or
in private health facilities.7 4 Other rules specify the functions of health and
social services agencies (replaced by Integrated Health and Social Services
Centre or Integrated University Health and Social Services Centre") as
well as the functions and powers of the Minister.7 6
Section 2 of the Quebec Act sets out the organizing principles that
guide in the "provision of end-of-life care":
(1) respect for end-of-life patients and recognition of their rights and
freedoms must inspire every act performed in their regard;
(2) end-of-life patients must be treated, at all times, with understanding,
compassion, courtesy and fairness, and with respect for their dignity,
autonomy, needs and safety; and
(3) the healthcare team providing care to end-of-life patients must
establish and maintain open and transparent communication with them.
With respect to patient rights, section 4 of the Quebec Act provides
that "[e]very person whose condition requires it has the right to receive
end-of-life care, subject to the specific requirements established by this
Act." Subject to the availability of resources, a person will have access
to this care in an institution, in a palliative care hospice or at home." In
addition, no one can refuse end-of-life care to a person "for previously
having refused to receive certain care or having withdrawn consent o
certain care."7" A patient dissatisfied with his or her end-of-life care may
file a complaint through existing mechanisms, but such complaint must
now be treated as a matter of priority.7 9
similar position alleging discrimination for not allowing minor to get access to medical aid in dying,
see Commission des droits de la personne et de lajeunesse, supra note 57.
72. Quebec Act, supra note 3, ss 7-12.
73. Ibid, ss 13-15.
74. Ibid, s 16.
75. An Act to Modify the Organization and Governance of the Health and Social Services Network,
in Particular by Abolishing the Regional Agencies, CQLR c 0-7.2 (adopted 7 February 2015). See
especially ss 4-7.
76. QuebecAct, supra note 3, see ss 17-18 and 19ff.
77. Ibid, s 4.
78. Ibid, s 6.
79. Ibid, s 48. See also, available only in French: Le Protecteur du citoyen, Memoire du Protecteur
du citoyen prdsente a la Commission de la sante et des services sociaux dans le cadre des consultations
particulieres et auditions publiques sur le Projet de loi no 52, Loi concernant les soins de fin de vie,
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The Quebec Act also addresses conscientious objections by physicians
who object to providing end-of-life care."o In this case, a mechanism is
set out in order to find another physician to provide medical assistance
in dying. A physician who refuses for conscientious reasons must notify
and forward the medical assistance in dying request form to the executive
director of the institution (or of the local authority) in which he practices,
or to any other person designated by the executive director. The person in
charge must then find another physician to provide this care."
As mentioned, the legislation also creates rules pertaining to the
organization of end-of-life care in institutions. Specifically, section 7 of
the Quebec Act stipulates the obligation to offer end-of-life care in a way
that is complementary to the other care provided to the patient, and in
a manner that promotes a multi-disciplinary approach and collaboration
between the various care providers. There are also rules clarifying the
location where care will be offered.82 Each institution has the obligation to
adopt a policy regarding end-of-life care.83 The institution's organizational
plan must provide for "a clinical program for end-of-life care."" Section
10 adds that "[t]he code of ethics adopted by an institution... must have
due respect for the rights of end-of-life patients." These measures certainly
will improve the quality of available information for patients and thus
ensure better communication between patients and medical professionals.
The new law also contains a series of measures aimed at improving
communication between the patient and the medical body" and the
consideration of a person's wishes.86 The effectiveness of these measures
remains to be proven. All ofthese aspects could be useful to other provinces
and territories for their law reform on end-of-life care.
septembre 2013.
80. Quebec Act, ibid, s 31. See also Code of ethics of physicians, CQLR c M-9, r 17, s 24: It is
a similar rule as in the case of a refusal to perform an abortion for reasons of conscience or belief.
However, the physician who refuses to perform medical aid in dying does not have to find a physician
who will do it; he or she has to notify the responsible person in the institution to which he or she refers
and a physician will be found that way. This procedure ensures a better protection of a physician's
conscience.
81. Quebec Act, ibid, s 31.
82. Ibid. See ss 11-12, regarding the obligation to offer an individual room to a patient in the last
days of his life.
83. Ibid, s 8.
84. Ibid, s 9.
85. See QuebecAct, supra note 3, ss 2, 8, 9, 29.
86. See Part 11-1 Clarifications regarding already recognized practices, above, for more on this
topic.
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4. Measures aimed at increasing knowledge and surveillance of end-of-
life care
The Quebec Act establishes the Commission sur les soins de fin de vie,
which will monitor end-of-life care. The Commission is made up of
eleven members, two of whom are to be jurists, appointed for a mandate of
five years, with one renewal permitted." The mandate of this Commission
is quite broad," with section 42 stipulating that "the Commission is to
examine any matter relating to end-of-life care". Among other things, its
mandate includes the evaluation of the implementation of the Quebec Act
in a global way for all end-of-life care. The Commission may "refer to the
Minister any mater relating to end-of-life care that needs the attention of
or action by the Government" and, conversely, the Minister may give the
Commission additional mandates. The Commission will be required to
submit a report to the Minister on the state of end-of-life care every five
years, as well as an annual activity report.8 9
The Commission is also responsible for overseeing, after the fact, "the
specific requirements relating to medical aid in dying."9 0 Physicians who
provide such care will have to advise the Commission within 10 days.9 1
The Provincial-Territorial Expert Advisory Group recommended
establishing "a pan-Canadian Commission on End-of-Life Care to provide
system oversight and to report to the public." 9 2 It might not prove necessary
to create such a national entity if each province and territory has its own
system of oversight like the one that exists in Quebec. Nevertheless, what
is needed is collaboration between the different levels of governments to
make sure that Parliament can have access to the information across the
country. In that sense, recommendation 16 of the Special Joint Committee
Report is of interest.
Conclusion
Quebec's legislative approach respecting end-of-life care is broad and
offers, within a continuum of care, several options, including palliative
care and medical assistance in dying, which should be available in
a complementary way. On the basis of the dignity of the patient, the
legislation was legitimized by the Supreme Court of Canada in Carter.
87. Quebec Act, supra note 3, s 39. For further details on how the Commission will operate, see ss
40-41.
88. Ibid, ss 42ff. No exhaustive analysis will be made.
89. Ibid. See also s 44 regarding solicitation of external opinion and the commission of research,
studies or expertise.
90. Ibid, s 42. See also s 47.
91. Ibid, s 46.
92. Provincial-Territorial Expert Advisory Group, supra note 13, recommendation 40.
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The Quebec Act offers a balance between social/political consensus and
fundamental rights and values. Its short history shows that it is helping to
shape the future of end-of-life care across Canada. Some elements remain
fragile, considering the contentious issues inherent to end-of-life debates.
The fact that a patient may choose between various types of care enhances
autonomy even when medical assistance in dying is not the chosen option.
Gloria Taylor herself confirms the importance of choice in the context of
end-of-life care:
My present quality of life is impaired by the fact that I am unable to say
for certain that I will have the right to ask for physician-assisted dying
when that "enough is enough" moment arrives. I live in apprehension
that my death will be slow, difficult, unpleasant, painful, undignified and
inconsistent with the values and principles I have tried to live by....93
This suggests that some people would not hesitate to prematurely
jeopardize their own life, and are prepared to do so in difficult conditions,
thereby infringing their dignity.
Even if the Quebec government has struck a balance between
autonomy and competing values, maintaining this balance will require
constant vigilance. The monitoring Commission, health-care institutions
and professional associations must take this responsibility very seriously.94
The guiding principles of the Quebec Act can assist in this sense.95 The
legislation adopts an approach centered on the patient and this should help
prevent unnecessary litigation over end-of-life decisions between family
members or between family members and health professionals.96
93. Carter, supra note 4 at para 13.
94. The Commission is in the early days of its creation and it is worth mentionning that some are
criticizing the manner in which it exercices its role. See namely Alain Naud, "La Commission sur
les soins de fin de vie ddrape," Letter of opinion, Le Devoir (14 September 2016), online: <http://
www.ledevoir.com/societe/ethique-et-religion/479880/la-commission-sur-les-soins-de-fin-de-vie-
derape>, Isabelle Pare, "Aide a mourir: une rencontre pour trouver un terrain d'entente," Le Devoir
(9 September 2016), online: <http://www.ledevoir.com/societe/sante/479614/rencontre-entre-le-
college-des-medecins-et-la-commission-des-soins-de-fin-de-vie> and Is belle Pare, "L'impartialit6
de la Commission mise en doute," Le Devoir (19 September 2016), online: <http://www.ledevoir.
com/politique/canada/480283/la-commission-sur-les-soins-de-fin-de-vie-est-elle-vraiment-neutre-et-
impartiale>.
95. Quebec Act, supra note 3, s 2 states: "The provision of end-of-life care is to be guided by the
following principles: (1) respect for end-of-life patients and recognition of their rights and freedoms
must inspire every act performed in their regard; (2) end-of-like patients must be treated, at all times,
with understanding, compassion, courtesy and fairness, and with respect for their dignity, autonomy,
needs and safety; and (3) the healthcare team providing care to end-of-life patients must establish and
maintain open and transparent communication with them."
96. Lambert, supra note 50. This conflict will have lasted more than two years, that is since the
beginning of 2013, when Vincent Lambert's physicians wanted to obtain cessation of treatment by
using the collegial procedure provided for by the Law no 2005-370 Law of 22 April 2005 on patients'
rights and the end of life (called The Leonetti Law). It also took many procedures and judgments to
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Furthermore, even if it was not necessary for the purpose of resolving
Carter, the Supreme Court nevertheless dealt with the division of powers
and opined that "[h]ealth is an area of concurrent jurisdiction" and that
"aspects of physician-assisted ying may be the subject of valid legislation
by both levels of government, depending on the circumstances and focus
of the legislation."9 7 Several recommendations of the Special Joint
Committee Report are asking for a collaborative approach between the
Government of Canada and the provinces and territories on the issue.9 8
It is to be hoped that such a perspective will avoid constitutional debates
over the Quebec Act and future provincial and territorial laws and help to
constructively build the response for end-of-life care for every Canadian.
As governments embark on discussions of law reform, the questions they
must deal with should be resolved in light of the needs of individuals at
the end of their lives.
During the editing of this paper, Parliament adopted legislation
to amend the Criminal Code.9 9 The eligibility criteria are very similar
to the Quebec legislation in many aspects.00 Medical aid in dying is
make it to the European Human Rights Court.
97. Carter, supra note 4 at para 53. The Supreme Court of Canada rejected the argument of
interjurisdictional immunity with regard to health.
98. Special Joint Committee Report, supra note 13. See also Provincial-Territorial Expert Advisory
Group, supra note 13, recommendation 2: "Provinces and territories should collaborate and coordinate
with all relevant organizations and institutions as soon as possible to ensure the smooth and timely
implementation of physician-assisted ying in Canada."
99. Bill C-14, supra note 64. Since the objective of this paper is to present the Quebec legislative
experience, we will not elaborate on or discuss this recent amendment, but we could not remain silent
about it.
100. Section 241.2 sets out the eligibility criteria which are less restrictive than those of the Quebec
legislation They are also expressed differently than in the Carter, supra note 4 decision Section241.2
reads as follow:
(1) A person may receive medical assistance in dying only if they meet all of the following
criteria:
(a) they are eligible-or, but for any applicable minimum period of residence or waiting
period, would be eligible-for health services funded by a government in Canada;
(b) they are at least 18 years of age and capable of making decisions with respect o their health
(c) they have a grievous and irremediable medical condition
(d) they have made avoluntary request for medical assistance in dying that, in particular, was
not made as a result of external pressure; and
(e) they give informed consent to receive medical assistance in dying after having been
informed of the means that are available to relieve their suffering, including palliative care.
(2) A person has a grievous and irremediable medical condition only if they meet all of the
following criteria:
(a) they have a serious and incurable illness, disease or disability;
(b) they are in an advanced state of irreversible decline in capability;
(c) that illness, disease or disability or that state of decline causes them enduring physical or
psychological suffering that is intolerable to them and that cannot be relieved under conditions
that they consider acceptable; and
(d) their natural death has become reasonably foreseeable, taking into account all of their
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available to persons over 18 years, who "have a grievous and irremediable
condition,"101 who have made a free and informed request, and who are
"in an advanced state of irreversible decline in capability"10 2 that causes
them "physical or psychological suffering that is intolerable" and which
cannot be alleviated "under conditions that they consider acceptable ."103
The debate was polarized, especially on the question of the interpretation
of the moment when one can access medical aid in dying.104
As to the possibility of requesting medical aid in dying in advance
directives or for allowing it to minors or to mentally ill persons for that
sole reason, the Preamble of Bill C-14 invites Parliament to continue to
explore these avenues in the future.
Depending on the interpretation that will be given by courts to this
new piece of legislation, the Quebec Act might need to be adjusted. This is
a clear example of the rapid changes legislation can prompt. The Quebec
statute which was breaking new ground before Carter is now dragging
behind with respect to the conditions associated with access to medical
assistance in dying. Nevertheless, the cautious way in which Parliament
established eligibility showed the influence of the legislative experience
and the democratic debate that occurred in Quebec, which has and
continues to inform the future of end-of-life care in Canada.
medical circumstances, without a prognosis necessarily having been made as to the specific
length of time that they have remaining.
101. The Quebec legislation is more restrictive since it limits access to persons with an "illness,"
whereas the federal statute refers to: "illness, disease or disability."
102. The Quebec legislation is more restrictive as it requires that a person ought to be at "the end of
life."
103. Compare the similarities of sections 241.2 (2)(c) of Bill C-14, supra note 64 and 26(6) of the
Quebec Act, supra note 3.
104. As defined in Bill C-14, supra note 64 s 242.2 (2)(d): "their natural death has become reasonably
foreseeable, taking into account all of their medical circumstances, without a prognosis necessarily
having been made as to the specific length of time that they have remaining." This section is clearly
less restrictive than the Quebec Act, supra note 3 which refers to "end of life" and there is a debate as
to whether it meets the criteria established by Carter. We are of the opinion that the wording of this
section provides enough flexibility for the courts to manage the specific circumstances of each case
and take into account the most delicate situations. We are of the opinion that it does not infringe the
Charter supra note 10, and if it does, we think it is justifiable in a democratic society under its section
1 given the political debates that led to the adoption of the amendments to the Criminal Code.
